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Hastening Death
The Seven Deadly Sins of the Status Quo
Charles H. Baron, A.B., LL.B., Ph.D.
The law regarding end-of-life treatment is at an awkward and dangerousstage. In response to modern medicine’s capacity to prolong life beyond
the point some patients can bear, U.S. courts, beginning with Quinlan,1 have
effected a series of compromises in the law of homicide and assisted suicide.
The compromises have left us feeling fairly secure as to the handling of the
most common and pressing end-of-life dilemmas. However, they rely on a
complicated, fictional conceptual framework that will not bear close scrutiny.
Under current law, positive acts, like switching off a ventilator, are treated as
mere “omissions to act.” (At least when physicians take such action for con-
senting, terminally ill patients. Turning off a ventilator would clearly be treated
as an “action” if you and I went into an ICU and did it on a drunken spree.)
Physicians’ acts in hastening death with pain medication are considered not to
be acts of homicide if, and only if, the physician who prescribes the medication
is thinking (while prescribing) that he or she is primarily trying to suppress
pain and only incidentally shortening life. (That such acts are homicide, how-
ever, if the secret intention at the moment of prescription is to shorten the life
of the suffering patient is reminiscent of the regime of birth control before
Griswold v. Connecticut.2 In those days, packs of condoms bore the legend, “For
prevention of disease only.” Whether someone using a condom was commit-
ting a crime or not depended upon whether he or she secretly harbored a for-
bidden intention to avoid pregnancy at the time of use.)
The present conceptual framework finds defenders in those who seek “bright
line” distinctions between what is to be forbidden and what is to be permitted
in ending the lives of terminally ill patients. Kamisar and Coleman, for example,
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argue that we must cling to current boundary concepts to avoid sliding down a
slippery slope to invidiously discriminatory involuntary euthanasia.3 However,
there is little evidence that current concepts mark clear boundaries for those in
practice. Foley, among others, has pointed out the difficulty physicians have
in understanding and applying current criteria for deciding what is lawful and
what is not;4 and experience over the years since Quinlan shows that grabbing
at bright-line distinctions doesn’t keep us from sliding down slippery slopes.
Quinlan’s recognition of the right of a patient in a persistent vegetative state
to refuse (by proxy) an indefinite existence on a ventilator, for example, seems
to have become today’s right of any competent patient to hasten death by re-
fusing to eat or to drink.5 Advocates of a bright-line distinction are continually
forced to look for new stopping points. Kamisar, who used to argue that respect
for human life would be unalterably undermined if laws regarding homicide and
assisted suicide were interpreted to allow patients to refuse life-prolonging treat-
ment, now takes only a rearguard position opposing exceptions for physician-
assisted suicide and active euthanasia.6
Attempting to cling to bright-line distinctions does not seem to offer us much
protection, and it comes at significant cost. In the case of the line purportedly
drawn against physician-assisted suicide, we have created at least the following








• deadly risk of error and abuse
Inhumanity
Denying physician-assisted suicide as an option to terminally ill patients means
enforced suffering for many patients. If hastening of death is available only to
those who can obtain it through refusal of life-prolonging treatment, such as
cardiopulmonary resuscitation or artificial ventilation, then patients who do
not need such treatment are required to soldier on. (Ironically, the opposite
may be true for terminally ill patients who require temporary life support or
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an intervention to correct a life-threatening complication. They may feel forced
into refusing treatment prematurely for fear that an option to refuse may not
come later, at a time when they might dearly want it.) Of course, recent years
have seen efforts to expand the concept of “refusal of treatment” to include re-
fusal to drink or eat—an option that is available to any patient at any time.
Even assuming that the law recognizes such a right to dehydrate or starve
oneself to death, it hardly provides the humane option (for the patient or the
patient’s loved ones) afforded by a system of physician-assisted suicide that
might provide a swift, painless, and dignified death at a time of the patient’s
choosing and in the company of his or her friends and family.
Paternalism
In denying legality to physician-assisted suicide, we are currently granting
society the power to tell dying patients, “You must continue to suffer because it
is good for you.” Some members of our society believe, as Callahan does, that
suffering at the end of life may serve some important goal for the dying per-
son. “Our duty,” he says, “is to enhance one another’s good and welfare, and the
relief of suffering will ordinarily be an important way to accomplish that. But
not always. What we need to know is whether the suffering exists because with-
out it some other human good cannot be attained; and that is exactly the case
with the suffering caused by living out one’s moral duties or ideals for a life.”7
Adherents of such a view may base their paternalism on avowedly religious
grounds. In some religious systems, suicide is forbidden under all circumstances
—even if it is to avoid unbearable suffering while facing imminent death from
a terminal disease. Certainly, those who wish to follow such religious precepts
by bravely bearing a long and painful dying process should have the right to do
so—whether or not society believes it is good for them. On the other hand,
why shouldn’t those who are not so committed have the same right to decide
what is best for themselves? Imagine a legislature dominated by Jehovah’s
Witnesses: Would we tolerate its members’ forbidding those of us who are not
adherents of their religion the right to a life-saving blood transfusion because
they believed it to be proscribed in the Bible?
Of course, Jehovah’s Witnesses have typically been victims, rather than prac-
titioners, of medical paternalism. In the s and early s, blood transfu-
sions were often forced on them “for their own good.” Doctors who believed
that rejecting life-saving treatment on such religious grounds was irrational got
the legal system to support them in that judgment.8 American physicians were
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at the peak of their power to decide what was best for their patients. In a 
article in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Oken reports that
oncologists regularly refused to tell patients the truth about their condition.
“Most people do not want to know,” was a typical reason given for not being
honest. “Knowledge of cancer is ‘a death sentence,’ ‘a Buchenwald,’ and ‘tor-
ture.’ Telling is ‘the cruelest thing in the world,’ ‘awful,’ and ‘hitting the patient
with a baseball bat.’” However, study after study had demonstrated that the
vast majority of cancer patients actually wanted to be told the truth. How to
explain the discrepancy? Oken concludes,
Avoidance of telling reflects the psychological problems of the doctor. If any
group is constantly bombarded with the awful fact of death it is doctors—
the same group which has such strong needs to conquer it. . . . Situations of
this kind, associated with intense charges of unpleasant emotions, call forth
a variety of psychological defenses which reduce the intensity of feelings to
manageable proportions. Among such defenses are those which involve the
avoidance, negation, or denial of the existence of some unpleasant fact, and
acting as if it were not real.9
Similarly, those physicians who today oppose legalization of physician-assisted
suicide may be concerned more with their own feelings than with their pa-
tients’ welfare. Solomon has documented the fact that physicians tend to avoid
methods of hastening death that leave them feeling directly responsible for
“killing” the patient.10 They prefer ending life-prolonging treatment over assist-
ing suicide and, still more, favor not starting such treatment over stopping it
once it’s begun. “Among the motivations for entering medicine,” Oken observes,
“the wish to conquer suffering and death stands high on the list. Practicing
physicians are not the kind of persons who can sit quietly by while nature pur-
sues its course.”11 The law no longer allows the physician’s needs to outweigh
those of the patient when it comes to sitting quietly by “while nature pursues
its course.” The law should not allow them to trump those of the patient as
regards legalization of the practice of physician-assisted suicide.
Utilitarianism
The most common form of argument made in support of the status quo es-
sentially tells dying patients, “You must continue to suffer because it is good for
us.” Dying patients’ interests, it is said, must be sacrificed for the public good.
One variant is the claim that keeping physician-assisted suicide illegal helps mo-
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tivate the health care system to improve delivery of palliative care. Reducing
patient suffering by allowing physicians to hasten death makes it too easy, this
argument contends, for society to escape its obligation to render dying more
comfortable. Foley and Hendin, for example, endorse “the World Health Orga-
nization recommendation that governments not consider the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia until they have demonstrated the full
availability and practice of palliative care for all citizens.”12 It is hard not to
sympathize with any strategy for improving the delivery of palliative care; but
what evidence is there that forcing individual patients to undergo unnecessarily
prolonged lives will succeed in doing that? Indeed, empirical evidence from the
Oregon experiment would seem to demonstrate just the opposite—that delivery
of palliative care improves when physician-assisted suicide is an option.13
Most troubling, this strategy conscripts suffering patients as cannon fodder—
and for what is likely to be a very long campaign. (“I’m sorry, Mr. Smith. Let-
ting you end your life early to avoid your personal suffering is too easy an out
for the health care delivery system. We can’t let anyone do that until the system
has demonstrated to our satisfaction that there is ‘full availability and practice
of palliative care for all citizens.’”) If winning the palliative care battle in this
way really makes sense and has moral validity, why aren’t we denying patients
the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment in situations in which better pal-
liative care might have prevented them from throwing in the towel? This would
put at stake the suffering of many thousands more patients each year and would
presumably apply that much more pressure on “the system.”
A willingness to sacrifice the interests of individual dying patients for those of
society as a whole is also at the heart of every form of “slippery-slope” argument
made in support of the status quo. Opponents of physician-assisted suicide warn
us that the price of too much compassion for a particular suffering, terminally ill
patient may be abuse of other patients and a general undermining of respect for
human life. These seem to be empirical claims—appeals to laws of cause and
effect. However, it is sometimes hard to know exactly what is being predicted.
That doctors or relatives will not fully understand how to use the criteria for de-
termining when it is all right, and when not, to assist a suffering patient to end his
life? That they will make mistakes in determining the relevant facts? That they will
cheat (out of self-interest, on the basis of prejudice, and the like)? Or is it a more
global claim that the bonds of civilization will be generally cast aside once our
society no longer enshrines as an absolute principle the sanctity of human life?
Whatever the precise import of the claims, they are serious and deserve to
be taken seriously. They were, of course, taken seriously by the U.S. courts that
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gradually fashioned what has become the right to refuse life-prolonging treat-
ment. At each stage, the courts recognized that respect for the rights of in-
dividual suffering patients required more than merely giving in to fear of the
unknown. Taking tentative steps, the courts promulgated substantive standards
and procedural protections that were designed to mitigate the risk of slippery-
slope problems while freeing palliative care practitioners to act with greater
respect for patient autonomy and increased compassion for the plight of the
terminally ill.14
Would legalizing physician-assisted suicide make the risks any greater or
more intractable? The patient who is considering a hastened death by refusal
of life support is no less vulnerable to depression, coercion, prejudice, financial
pressure, ineffective communication, mental incompetence, failure of adequate
palliative care, impatience of medical personnel, or mistaken prognosis or
diagnosis than the patient who is considering a hastened death by physician-
assisted suicide. Indeed, as to some of these risks, legalization of refusal of
treatment would seem more dangerous than legalization of physician-assisted
suicide. Is a vulnerable patient more likely to succumb to a request that she
commit suicide or to the statement, “You know, Mrs. Jones, maybe we’ve put
you through enough. Maybe it’s time to think of giving up?” Are impatient or
prejudiced medical personnel more likely to be tempted to cut financial and
emotional costs by means of physician-assisted suicide or by terminating life-
prolonging treatment that they can claim has become “medically inappropri-
ate?” Ironically, there may be less slippery-slope basis for denying patients the
option of physician-assisted suicide than for denying them the right to refuse
treatment. At the very least, there is no more.
Hypocrisy
A major vice of the current regime is its corrupting influence on the health
care professions. An air of hypocrisy currently surrounds the practice of pallia-
tive care. Despite the illegality of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, many
health care professionals admit to engaging in one or the other practice when
they feel circumstances require it. “Don’t worry,” they will say in private (almost
with a wink), “such steps are being taken when they need to be. Everyone knows
that they are. The law doesn’t need to get involved here. Better to leave all this
to the individual physician’s clinical judgment.” Although the American Medical
Association takes a public stand against physician-assisted suicide,15 it seems
opposed only to its legalization, not to its practice. Despite a number of articles
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reporting fairly widespread practice of physician-assisted suicide—some of them
published in the pages of its own journal16—the association has not taken steps
to find out who these physicians are in order to have them disciplined. Indeed,
it has not even expressed shock to find that the practice is going on. Rather
than being concerned with protecting society and patients from the evils of as-
sisted suicide, the American Medical Association appears concerned to protect
its members from the evils of legalization—the bad public relations or in-
creased legal oversight that might result from an admission that doctors some-
times take positive steps to terminate the lives of suffering patients.17
Lawlessness
Physicians are not the only ones taking the law into their own hands. Mercy
killings by family members are regularly reported in the press; many more
most likely go unreported and undetected. Prosecutions are often dropped,
grand juries do not indict, and trial juries acquit. When there are convictions,
they are usually followed by light sentences. As a particularly striking example,
consider the case of Vernal “Bob” Ohlrich of Nebraska. In October , when
Mr. Ohlrich was seventy-six, he responded to his seventy-four-year-old wife’s
pleas for relief from the pain she suffered while being treated for colon cancer
by entering her hospital room with a gun and killing her with one shot to the
head. Mr. Ohlrich then turned the gun on himself, but it misfired. He was
charged with first-degree murder but avoided trial by agreeing to plead to
manslaughter. In a bizarre twist, the state pathologist who autopsied Mrs.
Ohlrich reported her to have been free of cancer at the time of her death. The
prosecutor accepted the results of the autopsy but, noting that Mrs. Ohlrich
had once been diagnosed with cancer and was in pain at the time of her death,
recommended that Mr. Ohlrich serve only a short term in prison.18 In July
 Mr. Ohlrich was sentenced to two years in a correctional facility. (The
maximum penalty for manslaughter in Nebraska is twenty years in prison and
a $, fine.) A year later, he was paroled.19
Mr. Ohlrich fared better than sixty-six-year-old Dietrich “Whitey” Brandt of
Pennsylvania, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for beating his sixty-
five-year-old wife to death with a two-foot-long oxygen tank in answer to her
prayers for death to end her suffering from asthma, congestive heart failure,
and diabetes.20 Mr. Ohlrich did not do as well, however, as forty-two-year-old
Susan Scheufler of New York. She smothered her fifty-five-year-old terminally
ill husband with a pillow on his deathbed. The Rensselaer County district
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attorney refused to prosecute.21 Overall, mercy killings receive increasingly
lenient treatment. Back in , when seventy-five-year-old Roswell Gilbert shot
to death his seventy-three-year-old wife to end her suffering from Alzheimer’s
disease and osteoporosis, the State of Florida convicted him of first-degree
murder and sent him to prison for life. In  the governor pardoned him.22 By
 a Florida court felt it could acquit seventy-two-year-old Justina Rivero of
attempted murder (on grounds of insanity) for having laced her Alzheimer’s-
afflicted husband’s food with rat poison.23 In that same year, a Florida prosecu-
tor refused even to bring charges against seventy-one-year-old Elaine McIlroy
after she confessed three times to three different police departments that she
had assisted the suicide of her seventy-five-year-old, leukemia-suffering hus-
band by sprinkling the contents of Seconal tablets over his chocolate ice cream.
Florida judges and prosecutors expressed decreased willingness to pursue such
cases because they viewed them more compassionately than they previously had
and because of “lack of evidence, uncooperative family members, and juries’
reluctance to convict defendants.”24
Injustice
Manifestly, those who break the law to end the suffering of patients and loved
ones cannot expect equal treatment under law. Whether they will be sentenced
to life in prison or left completely alone will depend on the luck of their draw of
police officers, emergency medical personnel, public prosecutors, grand juries,
trial juries, and judges—each of whom will have the chance to exercise his or
her discretion for or against leniency. Similarly, terminally ill patients cannot
expect just treatment under such a system. Although physician-assisted suicide
is technically illegal in almost all American jurisdictions, it most likely takes
place in all of them. Whether it will be available, however, to any given patient
will depend (everywhere but Oregon) less on the merit of that patient’s case
than on his or her ability to find an empathetic and courageous physician who
feels safe with the patient, the patient’s family, and the patient’s attending med-
ical personnel. In this respect, the present regime regarding physician-assisted
suicide is much like that regarding abortion before Roe v. Wade. In the s
and the early s, women with the right connections found physicians to pro-
vide them with professional help; those without were abandoned to the often
grotesque ministrations of amateurs. Today, it is the terminally ill patient—
unable to obtain physician assistance in suicide—who may be forced to resort
to a gunshot to the head or rat poison sprinkled on dessert.
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The Deadly Risk of Error and Abuse
Maintaining the present legal regime unduly heightens the risk of deadly mis-
takes and abuse in the treatment of terminally ill patients. In the face of in-
creasing sympathy for the plight of suffering patients, the legal system largely
looks the other way when physicians—and even family members—assist in
suicide. Of course, persons providing assistance have to keep in mind that
there is always the chance that they could be caught and punished, and some
argue that the threat of punishment provides a check against abuse sufficient
to ensure that assistance in suicide and euthanasia will be employed in only the
most compelling and meritorious cases.25 In the s some commentators
similarly argued that the threat of criminal punishment was enough to regu-
late decisions to withdraw life-prolonging treatment from terminally ill pa-
tients.26 However, we have wisely abandoned the “slow codes” and secret do-not-
resuscitate orders of days gone by in favor of open procedures for permitting
patients to die without undergoing last-ditch efforts at resuscitation. Post hoc
criminal review is a very rough tool for regulating such sensitive decisions—
especially when both the life of the patient and the freedom and reputation of
the actor are at stake. Criminal review comes too late to rectify any errors, such
as the apparent error involved in diagnosing colon cancer as the source of Mrs.
Ohlrich’s pain, and at a time when patients can no longer be interviewed as
to whether steps were taken on the basis of their competent, informed, and
voluntary consent.
Leaving regulation to the possibility of post hoc criminal review also dis-
courages honest communication among health care professionals and between
professionals and their patients.27 It inhibits helpful professional consultations
and the development of medical protocols. Fear of open discussion creates the
possibility that physician’s orders or patient’s wishes will be misread.28 Making
matters worse, the chilling effect of post hoc criminal review extends beyond the
realm of technically illegal practices such as physician-assisted suicide. Among
other things, physicians’ fear of appearing after the fact to have intentionally
hastened a patient’s death with morphine, as Foley points out, is a leading
cause of undertreatment of pain in terminally ill patients.29
The risk of deadly mistakes and abuse in the treatment of terminally ill pa-
tients is exacerbated in yet another way by the current regime. In attempting
to maintain a bright-line distinction between physician-assisted suicide and
refusal of life-prolonging treatment, the regime does not treat decisions opting
for the latter as seriously as it should. Today, we recognize not only the right of
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Jehovah’s Witnesses and others to refuse treatment on the ground that the
treatment itself is offensive to them and the right of patients or their proxies to
decide that, on balance, the patient would prefer to die relatively comfortably
without chemotherapy than live a somewhat extended uncomfortable life
with chemotherapy, but also the right of a patient who has decided that life
no longer has any meaning for him or her to end that life by refusing life-
prolonging treatment. In Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., for ex-
ample, Brophy’s exercise of his right to refuse life support was not based on
any objection to artificial nutrition or hydration; it was based on his frequently
expressed preference to have his life terminated by any means if he were ever to
end up in a persistent vegetative state. It just happened that ending artificial
nutrition and hydration was a convenient, if not the most merciful, way to ac-
complish that end.30
Such decisions to die raise the same issues of patient autonomy and com-
passion toward suffering patients that are raised by physician-assisted suicide,
and they face all the same risks of abuse and mistake. Yet the present regime
categorizes them as mere determinations to “let nature take its course.” Cole-
man, for one, sees the danger in this and calls on us to work with the organ-
ization Not Dead Yet “to minimize the damage resulting from professional,
cultural, and economic factors in the context of refusal of treatment.” (Indeed,
all of the cases of abuse of the disabled that she points to are cases involving re-
fusal of treatment.) She herself, however, is so caught up in the effort to retain
“the relatively ‘bright line’ distinction between passive measures that cause death
and active measures that cause death” that she treats the problem of abuse of
passive euthanasia as a lesser priority.31
Moving Forward
In  the Virginia Colony passed a law forbidding freed slaves from continu-
ing to reside within its boundaries.32 The society could not abide the presence
of living counterexamples to its racist theories of the black man’s inability to
become civilized and to live with whites in anything but a state of servitude.
Today, in similar fashion, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and other foes
of legalization of physician-assisted suicide feel they must do all they can to
terminate the Oregon experiment. It is a living contradiction of their claims
that progressing beyond the current regime will inevitably lead to unchecked
abuse and invidious discrimination. As legal experiments go, the Oregon law
has been extraordinarily successful. Over time, problems will doubtless surface,
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and changes will have to be made to correct them. Nevertheless, the five-year
Oregon experience demonstrates that there is no longer need to fear the un-
known. Whether through common-law development in the courts or by leg-
islative action, it is time to move on to the next stage in making laws that show
greater respect for patient autonomy and increased compassion for the plight
of the terminally ill.
Notes
. In re Quinlan,  N.J. ,  A.nd  ().
. Griswold v. Connecticut,  U.S.  ().
. Y. Kamisar, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Right’ to Assisted Suicide,” in The Case
against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by K. Foley and H. Hen-
din (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ), ‒; D. Coleman, “Not Dead
Yet,” in The Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by
K. Foley and H. Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ), ‒.
. K. Foley, “Compassionate Care, Not Assisted Suicide,” in The Case against Assisted
Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by K. Foley and H. Hendin (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, ), ‒, .
. R. McStay, “Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post Glucksberg
and Quill,” American Journal of Law and Medicine  (): ‒, .
. Y. Kamisar, “Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed ‘Mercy-Killing’ Legisla-
tion,” Minnesota Law Review  (): ‒, , ; Kamisar, “Rise and Fall of
the ‘Right’ to Assisted Suicide,” ‒.
. D. Callahan, “Reason, Self-determination, and Physician-Assisted Suicide,” in The
Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by K. Foley and
H. Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ), ‒, .
. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,  NJ ,  A.nd
 ().
. D. Oken, “What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes,” Journal of
the American Medical Association  (): ‒, , , .
. M.Z. Solomon, L. O’Donnell, B. Jennings, V. Guilfoy, S.M. Wolf, K. Nolan, R. Jack-
son, D. Koch-Weser and S. Donnelley, “Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional
Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments,” American Journal of Public Health  ():
‒
. Oken, “What to Tell Cancer Patients,” .
. K. Foley and H. Hendin, “A Medical, Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Perspective,”
introduction to The Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, ed-
ited by K. Foley and H. Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ),
‒, .
. L. Ganzini, H.D. Nelson, M.A. Lee, D.F. Kraemer, T.A. Schmidt and M.A. Delorit,
“Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes about and Experiences with End-of-Life Care Since Passage
The Seven Deadly Sins of the Status Quo 0 
chap21 baron 309-321  6/25/04  10:32 AM  Page 319
of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,” Journal of the American Medical Association 
(): ‒.
. C.H. Baron, “Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision Making within the American Family,”
Family Law Quarterly  (): ‒.
. P.R. Muskin, “The Request to Die: Role for a Psychodynamic Perspective on
Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Journal of the American Medical Association  ():
‒; T.E. Quill, B. Lo, and D.W. Brock, “Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Com-
parison of Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-
Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Journal of the American Medical
Association  (): ‒.
. A.L. Back, J.I. Wallace, H.E. Starks, and R.A. Pearlman, “Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses,”
Journal of the American Medical Association  (): ‒; S.H. Miles, “Physicians
and Their Patients’ Suicides,” Journal of the American Medical Association  ():
‒.
. A.M. Capron, “The Right to Die: Progress and Peril,” Euthanasia Review  ():
‒; S.M. Wolf, “Holding the Line on Euthanasia,” Hastings Center Report , Suppl.
no.  (): ‒.
. D. Hendee, “Deshler Man Calls Plea Right Thing ‘For the Kids,’” Omaha (Neb.)
World Herald, February , , ; D. Hendee, “Accuracy of Slaying Victim’s Autopsy
Questioned,” Omaha (Neb.) World Herald, February , , .
. D. Hendee, “Deshler Man Sentenced to Prison in Wife’s Death,” Omaha (Neb.)
World Herald, July , , ; R. Tysver, “Deshler Man Who Shot Ill Wife Wins Parole,”
Omaha (Neb.) World Herald, August , , .
. T. Gibb, “He Calls it Mercy, Jury Says Murder,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February
, , C.
. C. Woodruff, “A Final Breath Cloaked in Doubt,” Albany (N.Y.) Times Union,
January , , A.
. M. Billington and B. Walsh, “Freedom for Gilbert Quick Clemency in Murder
Case Stuns Family,” Fort Lauderdale (Fla.) Sun-Sentinel, August , , A.
. N. Sterghos and D. Lade, “Judge Rules Wife Insane, She Tried to Kill Husband
and Herself,” Fort Lauderdale (Fla.) Sun-Sentinel December , , B.
. S.P. Freedberg, “Murder or Mercy?” St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, January , , A.
. G.J. Annas, “Physician-Assisted Suicide—Michigan’s Temporary Solution,” Ohio
Northern University Law Review  (): ‒, .
. R.A. Burt, “Conversation with Silent Patients,” in Genetics and the Law II, edited
by A. Milunsky and G.J. Annas (New York: Plenum, ), ‒, .
. Back et al., “Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State.”
. D.A. Asch, “The Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,”
New England Journal of Medicine  (): ‒, .
. Foley, “Compassionate Care, Not Assisted Suicide.”
 0 CHARLES H. BARON
chap21 baron 309-321  6/25/04  10:32 AM  Page 320
. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc  Mass. ,  NE.nd  ().
. Coleman, “Not Dead Yet,”  (emphasis in original).
. A.L. Higginbotham and F.M. Higginbotham, “‘Yearning to Breathe Free’: Legal
Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia,” New York
University Law Review  (): ‒, ‒.
The Seven Deadly Sins of the Status Quo 0 
chap21 baron 309-321  6/25/04  10:32 AM  Page 321
